The Costs and Benefits of Growth: Lawrence, Kansas, 1990-2003 by Rosenbloom, Joshua L.
23Vol. 27, No.1,  Spring 2005
PRI KANSAS POLICY REVIEW
The Costs and Benefits of Growth:
Lawrence, Kansas, 1990-2003
Joshua L. Rosenbloom
Abstract
Since 1990 employment in the city of Lawrence,
Kansas has grown by 34 percent, nearly three times as
fast as the state as a whole. Such rapid growth both
creates economic benefits for residents and increases
the cost of city services. This paper shows that the
main beneficiaries of rapid growth were homeowners,
who realized capital gains because of the increasing
real estate values. Local workers experienced little or
no improvement in relative wage levels or reduced
chances of unemployment because job growth resulted
in substantial population migration. On the cost side,
city expenditures nearly doubled in real terms since
1990. This rise in spending was financed primarily
through increased sales tax revenues and higher
charges for city services. Thus the burden of increased
spending was distributed more widely than the
benefits of rising property values. The
extent to which the rise in city expendi-
tures is directly attributable to increased
population cannot be determined
without further investigation into the
changes in the quality of city services
provided.
Introduction
Few local political issues are as
contentious as those that revolve
around economic development policy.
Economic development officials com-
pete actively to attract new businesses
and retain existing ones, often by
offering tax abatements and other
financial incentives. Many citizens,
however, believe that these incentives
are too large, and the costs associated
with the resulting population growth
fall disproportionately on current
residents.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the
highly contentious debate about eco-
nomic development, much of the
discussion takes place with little refer-
ence to the facts. This article examines
the experience of one community,
Lawrence, Kansas, over the period since
1990.
Over the past several decades Lawrence has
experienced relatively rapid growth, expanding much
more quickly than the state as a whole, and outpacing
larger cities like Topeka and Wichita. Figure 1 com-
pares employment growth in Lawrence with that in
Topeka, Wichita, and the state as whole from 1990
through 2004. While employment in the state grew by
about 13 percent over this period, Lawrence’s employ-
ment grew more than 30 percent. In contrast, Topeka
and Wichita both experienced employment growth
slightly below that of the state.
 What are the costs and benefits of Lawrence’s rapid
growth? Economic development strategies begin from
the premise that attracting new businesses and new
jobs is on balance a good thing for a community. But
population growth also imposes costs on the commu-
nity. Both businesses and residents require a range of
city services, and increased services cost more money
to provide. Moreover, population growth imposes a
variety of less tangible impacts on current residents
through increased congestion, reductions in open
space, and changes in the built environment.
Figure 1
Employment Growth in Lawrence, Wichita, Topeka,
and Kansas, 1990-2004
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To disentangle these impacts and attempt to quan-
tify them, it is necessary to begin by laying out a more
formal conceptual framework. As the next section
makes clear, the impacts of job creation will be reflected
not just in labor markets, but in housing prices and the
cost of city services. After laying out this chain of
events, I turn to the evidence to document the magni-
tudes of these effects in Lawrence.
Conceptual Framework
Imagine that because of the attraction of a new
employer or expansion of an existing employer, 20 new
jobs are created in the community. These positions can
be filled by workers already employed in the commu-
nity, by residents of the community who are currently
unemployed or out of the labor force, or by migrants
from outside the community.
In the first case, the movement of workers creates
new vacancies that must be filled from the remaining
two sources. Thus, ultimately an increase in jobs will
result in some combination of reductions in unemploy-
ment (as unemployed or out of the labor force workers
take jobs), and increases in the population as new
workers move into the community. If there is a large
pool of unemployed workers available or if workers
from other communities are willing to migrate from
other places, then rising employment need not increase
wages in the community. If, however, these sources of
relatively “elastic” labor supply are not available, then
local wages may need to rise to induce more workers to
enter the labor force either from within the community
or from more distant places.
The direct effects of increased employment in turn
result in additional demand for locally produced ser-
vices that generates further employment growth. These
multiplier effects arise because of spending on locally
produced goods and services by the new business and
its employees. The resulting increase in sales will
induce local providers of these goods and services to
expand their workforce to meet additional demand.
The labor market effects of new job creation are
illustrated in Figure 2. In figure 2-A the local labor
supply is labeled “S.” The supply curve shows the
amount of labor that local residents will supply as a
function of the wage rate. It is upward sloping because
at higher wages those already working will supply
more effort, and some non-workers will be induced to
enter the labor force. Curve D1 denotes the initial
demand for labor. It slopes downward, showing that
employers will demand more labor at lower wages.
Curve D2 denotes labor demand after the addition of
20 new jobs. As a result of the shift from D1 to D2,
employment rises and wages rise. In figure 2-B the
response of non-residents to the improved employment
conditions in Lawrence causes the supply curve to
Figure 2
Labor Market Effects of New Job Creation
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shift to the right, from S1 to S2. As a result
of this migration response, employment
increases and wages decline.
Beyond its labor market effects, new
job creation has several other positive
impacts on the community. To the extent
that new jobs are filled through migration
into the community or a reduction in
migration out of the community, job
creation will contribute to increased
housing demand. Higher housing
demand will tend to increase the price of
the existing stock of housing, and en-
courage new construction. Local govern-
ment revenues will rise as a result of
increased housing values and through
increased local retail sales caused by
population growth.
New job creation also imposes a
variety of direct costs on the community.
The new or expanded business may
require additional city services, and new
residents attracted to the community will
place additional demands on sanitation,
water-supply, roads, schools, and public-
safety provision. All of these will necessi-
tate increases in city spending.
Impacts on the Local Labor Market
As Figure 1 illustrated, over the past
decade and a half employment in
Lawrence grew much faster than it did in
Kansas generally or in other larger cities
such as Topeka and Wichita. Where did
new labor market entrants come from?
We cannot directly link migration trends
with employment growth, but a variety of
labor market evidence indicates that the
rapid expansion of employment was met
largely by migration into Lawrence.
Rapid employment growth has not
produce an increase in relative pay in
Lawrence, or reduced the local unem-
ployment rate.
In 1990, average annual wages in
Lawrence were $16,248—equivalent to 70
percent of the U.S. average, or 80 percent
of the statewide average. By 2002, wages in Lawrence
had increased to $23,124, but this growth had not kept
pace with wage trends nationally or in the state. In
2002, average wages in Lawrence had slipped to just
66 percent of the national average and had fallen to 77
percent of the statewide average (see Table 1).
Similarly, Lawrence’s unemployment rate has
closely tracked movements in the state unemployment
rate since 1990 (see Figure 3). Thus, the rapid growth of
employment did not substantially benefit unemployed
or out-of-the-labor-force workers in Lawrence. Rather,
growth in employment has been met almost entirely
Table 1
Average Wages in Lawrence, Topeka, Wichita, Kansas,
and the U.S., 1990 and 2002
Relative Wage
Average Wage Average Annual  (U.S. = 100)
1990 2002 Rate of Growth 1990 2002
Lawrence $16,248 $23,124 3.21 69.91 65.91
Topeka $20,459 $29,526 3.33 88.04 84.16
Wichita $22,670 $31,788 3.07 97.55 90.61
Kansas $20,173 $30,169 3.66 86.80 86.00
U.S. $23,239 $35,082 3.74 100.00 100.00
Source: 1990-2001 from Harvard Business School, Institute for Strategy and
Competitiveness, Cluster Mapping Project; 2001-2002 from U.S. Census Bureau,
County Business Patterns.
Note: Average wage is the ratio of total annual payroll and total employment of all
private businesses.
Figure 3
Unemployment Rate in Lawrence, Topeka, Wichita,
and Kansas, 1990-2004
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through the migration of labor into the
community.1
Impacts on Local Real Estate
Markets
If rising labor demand did not produce
rising pay and falling unemployment for
local workers, it did contribute to a 31
percent increase in population, which
fueled increased housing demand. The
result was a marked rise in the price of
residential real estate. Unlike labor, which
is relatively mobile, land is fixed. As
population increases the demand for land,
the result is rising prices for this fixed
resource.
Data from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses
document the sharp rise in average home
values in Lawrence over this period.
Figure 4 plots the distribution of values of
owner-occupied residences in both years.
In 1990 only about one in five houses in
Lawrence was valued at more than
$100,000. By 2000, more than two-thirds of
houses were worth more than $100,000. As
a result of this shift, the median value of
owner occupied housing rose from $68,500
to $118,400 over the 1990s.
How one experiences the effect of rising
housing prices depends on whether one is
a homeowner or not. For new entrants or
those who do not own their residence,
rising housing prices are a negative, rais-
ing the cost of living. For homeowners,
however, while the implicit cost of housing
rises, the major effect is that the value of
their assets rises resulting in capital gains
as the value of their real estate assets rise
in value.
The divergence between the costs of
housing per se and the capital gains asso-
ciated with property ownership is evident
in the slower growth of rental rates over
the 1990s. Again using data from the 1990
and 2000 censuses, it is apparent that the
rental rates rose more slowly than did
house prices (Figure 5).2 Indeed the median
rent increased from $415 per month to
$555 per month (an increase of only 33
percent as compared to the 77 percent
increase in median house prices). In
general rents will increase less than the
prices of owner-occupied real estate
Figure 5
Distribution of Gross Rent for Renter-Occupied Units,
Lawrence, Kansas, 1990 and 2000
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Distribution of Values of Owner-Occupied Housing,
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because renters do not expect to capture
any of the expected future capital gains
associated with a booming real estate
market.
The past 15 years have seen a boom in
real estate prices not just in Lawrence but
in other communities as well. So separat-
ing that part of rising prices that is attri-
butable to Lawrence’s above average
growth requires establishing some base-
line of comparison. One possibility is to
compare house prices in Lawrence with
those in other, more slowly growing
communities.
Figure 6 compares housing prices in
Lawrence with those in Kansas and with
Topeka and Wichita, as well as for the
nation as a whole. Between 1990 and
2004 house prices in Lawrence increased
by 107 percent. But even in slowly grow-
ing Wichita prices increased 63 percent
over the same period, and prices rose
more quickly in Topeka, and statewide.
These comparisons suggest that had
Lawrence grown more slowly, housing
prices would have increased between 13
and 26 percentage points less than they
actually did.
For the owner of a house valued at
$68,500 in 1990—which was the median
value of owner-occupied units in that
year—this difference in growth rates
translates into a difference of between
$16,000 and $30,000 dollars in capital
gains. Obviously the benefits of these capital gains
were not distributed equally, since only property owners
participated in this increase.
Impacts on the Cost of Local Government
As local population increased, the costs of provid-
ing city services also increased substantially. Adjust-
ing for inflation, city expenditures approximately
doubled between 1990 and 2003, increasing substan-
tially faster than city population. This growth took
place in both general fund expenditures, city services
supported primarily by tax revenue, and in enterprise
fund expenditures, city services such as water and
sewers that are supposed to be funded by fees charged
to their users.3
Adjusted for inflation, general fund expenditures
more than doubled, rising from $29.5 million in 1990 to
$61.3 million in 2003. Since population increased by 31
percent over these years, this increase resulted in a
substantial rise in per capita costs of government. In
1990 city expenditures worked out to $449 per person
(in 2003 prices); by 2003 expenditures had risen to
$713 per head.
More insight about this rise in general fund expen-
ditures can be obtained by looking at separate catego-
ries of expenditures, as detailed in Table 2 (pg. 28).
There was relatively little increase in per capita costs
for public works, debt service, or capital outlays, sug-
gesting that growth did not result in significant in-
creases in the cost of these activities. On the other hand,
increases in spending on public safety ($115 per capita),
and general government ($81 per capita) account for the
bulk of the rise in costs of general fund expenditures.
Enterprise fund expenditures are a substantial
share of the total cost of government. In 2003 expendi-
tures for services covered by enterprise funds totaled
$35.7 million, or about 58 percent as much as general
fund expenditures. Water and sewer, and sanitation
are by far the largest component of these expenditures,
Figure 6
Housing Price Indexes in Lawrence, Topeka, Wichita,
Kansas, and U.S., 1990-2004
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accounting for 88 percent of enterprise expenditures in
2003, and are the only categories of expenditures for
which historical data are readily available. Between
1990 and 2003 expenditures for waters and sewers and
sanitation adjusted for inflation increased from $17
million to $31.7 million an increase of 81 percent. In
per capita terms this is an increase of $98, from $259
per person in 1990 to $357 per person in 2003. Through-
out this period spending on these two services grew at
nearly the same rate, so sanitation accounted for
approximately the same share of the total in 1990 (25
percent) as it did in 2003 (26 percent).
Table 2
Real General Fund Expenditures and Real General Fund Expenditures per Capita,
Total and by Function, City of Lawrence, 1990-2003
Panel A: Real Expenditures
GDP Total Debt General Public Public Capital All
Year Deflator Expenditure Service Government Safety Works Outlay Other
1990 77.0 $29,455,853 $5,870,909 $4,042,472 $8,286,046 $4,349,032 $565,007 $6,342,386
1991 79.7 31,621,871 4,888,563 4,747,729 10,349,298 4,470,358 1,044,304 7,165,922
1992 81.5 34,077,906 5,046,464 5,579,663 10,848,766 4,685,633 1,359,155 7,917,380
1993 83.4 31,259,053 4,273,441 5,131,128 10,467,695 5,027,304 1,276,874 6,359,484
1994 85.2 33,988,499 4,405,522 4,281,491 11,685,327 4,693,431 2,839,865 8,922,728
1995 86.9 41,797,583 4,741,643 4,701,816 12,509,643 4,686,969 5,708,328 15,157,511
1996 88.5 44,365,453 5,589,298 4,879,114 13,238,545 4,836,799 4,242,190 15,821,697
1997 90.0 49,771,749 7,445,335 6,243,384 15,355,925 5,263,743 4,777,453 15,463,363
1998 91.0 53,241,602 8,247,889 6,867,633 16,105,607 5,062,037 4,753,157 16,958,436
1999 92.3 49,261,663 7,400,439 7,516,705 16,172,347 5,164,168 4,462,388 13,008,003
2000 94.3 52,552,815 7,732,772 8,537,267 16,962,385 5,603,867 5,133,407 13,716,524
2001 96.6 59,260,892 8,244,696 13,843,520 17,971,069 5,916,690 4,050,999 13,284,917
2002 98.2 59,276,827 8,507,077 11,486,998 19,768,839 6,526,900 3,373,608 12,987,013
2003 100.0 61,307,127 9,308,568 12,286,275 20,760,197 6,554,869 1,690,388 12,397,218
Panel B: Real Per Capita Expenditures
Total Debt General Public Public Capital All
Year Population Expenditure Service Government Safety Works Outlay Other
1990 65,608 $449 $89 $62 $126 $66 $9 $97
1991 66,794 473 73 71 155 67 16 107
1992 68,017 501 74 82 160 69 20 116
1993 69,203 452 62 74 151 73 18 92
1994 71,316 477 62 60 164 66 40 125
1995 74,784 559 63 63 167 63 76 203
1996 77,325 574 72 63 171 63 55 205
1997 79,190 629 94 79 194 66 60 195
1998 80,843 659 102 85 199 63 59 210
1999 81,560 604 91 92 198 63 55 159
2000 80,098 656 97 107 212 70 64 171
2001 83,495 710 99 166 215 71 49 159
2002 85,282 695 100 135 232 77 40 152
2003 86,040 713 108 143 241 76 20 144
Change 1990-2003 $264 $19 $81 $115 $10 $11 $47
Sources: City of Lawrence, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for 2000 and 2003.
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Without historical data on other enterprise funds it
is not possible to precisely calculate the increase in
total city spending. But even if one assumes that other
enterprise funds did not grow at all, the total of all city
spending—general fund and enterprise funds
combined—would have increased at least 89 percent
since 1990. If the other enterprise fund expenditures
had grown at the same rate as water and sewer and
sanitation expenditures, then total spending would
have increased by 97 percent in real terms.4
Without further evidence we cannot link these
increases in government expenditures directly to rising
Table 3
Real Revenues and Real Revenues per Capita Total and by Source, City of Lawrence, 1990-2003
Panel A: Real Revenues
Taxes Inter-
governmental Licenses Charges for All
Year Total Total Real property Sales Transfers and Permits Services Other
1990 $30,255,940 $17,541,415 $8,788,283 $3,996,808 $5,066,178 $354,503 $957,894 $6,335,950
1991 33,119,869 20,039,780 8,122,343 7,763,673 6,914,907 355,617 990,792 4,818,772
1992 33,370,507 20,334,674 8,820,214 7,757,330 7,546,686 451,057 1,188,394 3,849,696
1993 34,570,355 22,088,133 9,165,148 8,732,022 7,241,569 499,323 1,123,985 3,617,345
1994 36,286,584 23,661,878 9,515,958 9,298,871 7,349,464 723,909 1,202,912 3,348,421
1995 48,537,538 24,608,093 9,959,341 9,893,589 16,865,204 570,986 1,871,724 4,621,531
1996 49,083,618 24,055,018 9,182,186 9,752,992 18,131,142 758,187 1,923,911 4,215,359
1997 53,254,929 24,739,830 9,701,193 10,138,478 19,074,080 594,655 4,243,566 4,602,798
1998 55,791,938 25,948,925 10,412,206 10,747,068 19,106,193 675,254 4,379,648 5,681,918
1999 51,585,107 26,873,905 11,078,550 11,037,308 15,220,730 715,731 3,317,203 5,457,538
2000 55,326,850 28,814,666 12,554,885 11,300,405 16,402,846 628,976 3,504,886 5,975,475
2001 60,285,723 29,886,067 13,222,431 11,384,264 20,136,991 699,425 4,277,804 5,285,436
2002 57,522,063 31,103,841 14,542,943 11,158,202 16,410,691 799,927 4,590,545 4,617,060
2003 61,501,631 32,656,686 15,814,366 11,392,376 17,248,387 1,024,587 4,534,620 6,037,351
Panel B: Real Per Capita Revenues
Taxes Inter-
governmental Licenses Charges for All
Year Total Total Real property Sales Transfers and Permits Services Other
1990 $46 $267 $134 $61 $77 $5 $15 $97
1991 496 300 122 116 104 5 15 72
1992 491 299 130 114 111 7 17 57
1993 500 319 132 126 105 7 16 52
1994 509 332 133 130 103 10 17 47
1995 649 329 133 132 226 8 25 62
1996 635 311 119 126 234 10 25 55
1997 672 312 123 128 241 8 54 58
1998 690 321 129 133 236 8 54 70
1999 632 329 136 135 187 9 41 67
2000 691 360 157 141 205 8 44 75
2001 722 358 158 136 241 8 51 63
2002 674 365 171 131 192 9 54 54
2003 715 380 184 132 200 12 53 70
Sources: City of Lawrence, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for 2000 and 2003.
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population. In part rising expenditures may reflect an
increase in the quantity or quality of services provided,
or they may reflect a general increase in the relative
cost of government provided services that are not
directly related to increased population. To identify the
part of rising expenditures attributable to growth per
se, we would need to establish what the increase in the
government spending would have been had popula-
tion growth been slower. Establishing this “counter-
factual” cost estimate is a complicated matter that is
beyond the scope of the present analysis. Data on costs
of government in other communities, however, provide
some baseline for comparison.
Despite increased city spending in Lawrence, the
cost of local government services remained below that
in Topeka ($748 per capita) and Wichita ($1,269 per
capita) in 2003. So it is possible that some of the growth
in costs of government in Lawrence reflects a process of
catching up in terms of provision of city services. It is
certainly the case that in the early 1990s Lawrence’s
spending on public safety was, in per capita terms,
well below the levels in Topeka and Wichita. In 1994
(the first year data was available these other cities)
Lawrence spent $164 per capita on public safety while
Topeka spent $284 and Wichita $212. Without measur-
ing the level of service provided, however, it is difficult
to tell whether the subsequent convergence in spend-
ing reflects an increase in the level of safety in
Lawrence, or is a consequence of rising population.
While the expenditure data indicate that the costs of
local government have risen substantially in Lawrence,
we must turn to data on revenues to understand how
the burden of these rising costs has been distributed.
Increased enterprise fund spending was financed
largely through increased fees charged to users. The
sources of increased general fund expenditures are
detailed in Table 3 (pg.29) in both absolute and per
capita terms. The column labeled “intergovernmental
transfers” consists of a variety of items, but the primary
source of these funds is a countywide sales tax that
was enacted in 1995.
The two major sources of funds and the two pri-
mary sources of growth in revenues over this period
are taxes and intergovernmental transfers. A number of
different sources contribute to the city’s tax revenues,
but the two largest sources are property taxes and sales
taxes. In 1990, property taxes contributed 29 percent of
government revenues. By 2003, their share in the total
had fallen to 25.7 percent. In per capita terms, property
taxes increased $50, from $134 to $184 (in 2003 prices)
between 1990 and 2003, while sales tax revenues in-
creased $72 dollars per capita and intergovernmental
transfers increased by $123 per capita. Thus, it seems
reasonable to conclude that much of the burden of the
rising cost of government was borne by consumers,
through the sales tax, rather than by homeowners,
through rising property taxes.5
Conclusion
Over the past decade and a half Lawrence has
experienced much more rapid growth than the state of
Kansas or other large communities in the state. The
primary beneficiaries of this growth have been local
property owners, who have seen house prices rise
considerably faster than the state as a whole. On the
other hand, the community’s relatively rapid growth
has not produced major gains for workers. Local wages
have actually grown somewhat more slowly than
wages in other communities and the state, while the
unemployment rate has closely tracked the statewide
rate.
Growth has been associated with a pronounced
increase in the costs of local government services. Even
after adjusting for inflation, local government spending
has approximately doubled over the period, far out-
pacing the growth in population. While property own-
ers have been the main beneficiaries of rapid growth,
the share of rising government costs borne by property
holders has been relatively small. Rather, the bulk of
rising costs have been covered from sales tax receipts,
and charges for city services such as water and sani-
tation. Thus, the costs of government have been spread
more widely among city residents generally (whether
or not they own property) and non-residents who shop
in the city.
At this point it is premature to draw any conclu-
sions about the relative size of the costs and benefits of
growth. In particular, without better information about
changes in the level of service provided by city govern-
ment it is risky to draw conclusions about the extent to
which rising expenditures can be treated as the
consequence of growth per se, rather than increased
discretionary expenditures designed to increase the
quality or quantity of city services. What is clear,
however, is that the costs of general government and
public safety have risen substantially with increasing
city size, and further examination of the reasons for
this growth would be of considerable interest.
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Notes
1. This observation should not be interpreted to mean that there
were no benefits to local residents arising from the rapid expan-
sion of employment. In a community with slowly growing em-
ployment some current workers might well be obliged to
migrate elsewhere in search of employment opportunities. To
the extent that rapid growth makes such migration unnecessary
local residents’ welfare may be said to have improved.
2. In Lawrence, rental properties were overbuilt in this period.
Excess capacity contributed to the small rise in rental rates and
reduced capital gains for owners of rental properties.
3. Other enterprise fund expenditures besides water and sewers
are sanitation, parking, storm water, and the municipal golf
course.
4. Some growth in other expenditures seems likely since the golf
course was not established until the mid-1990s.
5. Upendran and Darling (2004) report that the retail pull factor
in Lawrence in 2003 was 1.08, indicating that retail sales tax
collections in the city were 8 percent greater than its share of the
state population. Thus, it is possible that reliance on sales tax
revenue in effect spread the rising cost of government to non-
residents. But because retail pull-factors do not adjust for dif-
ference in community spending levels no firm conclusions can be
drawn about the extent to which costs were actually shifted.
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